octoturge
d8f8653dee
Until now every HTTP route was unauthenticated. A probe against the
running server returned a farm's `edgeProxyToken` and a printer's
`accessCode` to an anonymous caller, and that pair is enough to connect
as a farm's gateway and drive its printers. The previous commit stopped
the credentials appearing in responses; this one makes the routes ask
who is calling.
Authentication. Access tokens are verified against the Supabase
project's published JWKS via `createSupabaseJwtVerifier` from
`@continuum/ts-core`: RS256, public key only, no secret in this
process. It replaces the HS256 `@elysiajs/jwt` path, where
`SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET` was simultaneously the verification key and a
key that could mint tokens, present in the environment of every
instance. `src/auth/verifier.ts` builds it at module load so a
misconfigured deployment fails at boot rather than on first login.
The edge-gateway token stays symmetric and that is not an
inconsistency: this service is both its issuer and its only verifier,
so there is no second party to keep a secret from. It now carries an
`exp`, which it did not, despite the response saying
`expiresInSeconds: 3600`.
Tenancy. An org layer above farms - `organisations`,
`org_members(org_id, user_id, role)`, `farms.org_id` - so a farm can
have more than one operator without sharing an account. `farms.owner_id`
is gone. Authorization is one rule applied everywhere: resolve the
thing being acted on back to an organisation and check the caller's
role there, user -> org -> farm -> printer, with nothing in between
carrying permissions of its own. The ladder is
`viewer` < `operator` < `owner`; printer commands and job submission
need `operator`, because they move physical machines, and that is the
one boundary here that is not about data.
A non-member gets 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm that a given farm
or printer id exists and belongs to someone, which is an enumeration
oracle over the whole system. 403 is kept for a member who may see the
record but not do this to it.
List endpoints scope in the `where` clause, not after the query - a
filter applied to the result is one `return` away from being skipped.
They are also bounded now (`limit`/`offset`, default 50, max 200
refused rather than clamped).
`ownerId` and `submittedBy` no longer come from request bodies. Nor do
the printer telemetry columns: `POST /printers` is narrowed to the
columns a client owns, because a client that could POST
`status: "idle"` could make the scheduler send work to a printer that
is mid-print.
Also fills the CRUD gaps that made the API unusable - PATCH and DELETE
for farms, printers, jobs and orgs, and membership management - plus
one error shape for the whole API via `toErrorResponse`, so an
authorization failure is a throw that leaves the handler rather than a
status somebody has to remember to set.
Guards on the two changes that cannot be undone through the API:
removing or demoting an organisation's last owner, and deleting an
organisation while farms are still attached (it would cascade to every
printer, print job and stored frame).
Migration 0001 is hand-edited after generation. drizzle-kit emitted
`ADD COLUMN org_id uuid NOT NULL`, which cannot apply to a populated
table, and dropped `owner_id` without moving what it encodes anywhere.
It now adds the column nullable, creates one organisation per distinct
legacy owner with that user as its `owner` member, points each farm at
it, and only then tightens the column and drops `owner_id`. Verified
both ways: from empty via `drizzle-kit migrate`, and against a seeded
database where two farms shared an owner and a third did not.
Testing. `scripts/dev-auth.ts` is a local RS256 issuer publishing a
JWKS at the path the backend fetches, so the real verification path is
testable without a Supabase project. The alternative was a test-only
bypass in the backend - an env var making it trust an unsigned token -
which would be a permanent hole one misconfiguration from production,
and would mean the code under test is not the code that ships.
- `tests/authz.test.ts` (19 tests): the role ladder written out in full
rather than derived the same way the implementation derives it, and
the real JWKS path - a token signed by a key outside the JWKS, an
expired token and a token with `aud: "anon"` (Supabase's own anon key
is a valid project JWT) are all rejected, with the same message, so
probing cannot tell which part of a forged token to fix next.
- `scripts/e2e-authz.sh` (68 assertions, real Postgres, real routes):
four users across two organisations; anonymous 401s, cross-org 404s,
viewer-cannot-command, operator-cannot-rotate, a spoofed
`submittedBy` in the body ignored, no credential in any read, and the
rotated token still minting an edge JWT.
- `scripts/e2e-edge.sh` updated for the org layer and now authenticates
as a seeded `operator` - the weakest role that should work, so the
run would fail if the command boundary were not where it claims to
be. Re-verified against both live printers: telemetry from `h2c` and
`p1p` persisted, and an authenticated `set_fan_speed` went
HTTP -> WebSocket -> MQTT -> P1P and back `ok:true`, fan returned
to 0.
Two bugs found in the test scripts while writing this, both the same
shape as the earlier `pkill -f` incident: `kill "${PID:-0}"` with an
unset PID signals the whole process group, including the harness, and
`uuidgen` is not installed in this sandbox.
continuum-backend
Cloud control plane for Continuum. Bun + ElysiaJS, PostgreSQL (via pgCat/PgBouncer, with pgvector for frame embeddings), Valkey Streams, and Cloudflare R2 storage.
Run
bun install
scripts/dev-env.sh up # Valkey + Postgres/pgvector, and print the URLs
scripts/dev-env.sh schema # apply drizzle/ - same as bun run db:migrate
cp .env.example .env # fill in the URLs it printed, plus R2_*, SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET
bun run dev
scripts/dev-env.sh uses docker-compose.yml when a Docker daemon is
answering, and falls back to the same two services from apt when there is no
usable container runtime - some sandboxes cannot run Docker at all, because
dockerd needs CAP_NET_ADMIN for its bridge and user namespaces to unpack an
image, and neither can be granted from inside. scripts/dev-env.sh status
says which backend is in use.
Schema changes go through migrations: edit src/db/schema/, run
bun run db:generate, and commit the file it writes to drizzle/ along with
the schema change. scripts/dev-env.sh push reshapes a local database straight
from the schema with no migration file, which is faster while a table is still
moving but records nothing and will drop a column to make things match - so
generate before committing. drizzle/0000_*.sql creates the vector extension
itself; that line is hand-added, since drizzle-kit does not emit extension
statements and the migration would otherwise only apply to a database somebody
had already prepared.
Test
bun test # unit + protocol contract tests, no services needed
scripts/e2e-edge.sh # the whole edge path: real database, real printers
scripts/e2e-edge.sh seeds a farm, claims its printers, mints an edge token,
runs the real continuum-proxy against this backend, and asserts that live
telemetry reached Postgres and that a command reached a printer. It only ever
sends a fan speed, and only to a printer reporting IDLE.
scripts/capture-gateway-frames.js is the smaller tool: it stands in for this
backend and records what a gateway sends, for refreshing the fixtures in
tests/fixtures/.
Layout
src/db/- Drizzle schema (printers,farms,print_jobs,frame_embeddings) and client, pointed at pgCat.src/db/validators.tsderives Elysia/TypeBox request validators straight from the Drizzle tables viadrizzle-typebox, so the Postgres schema and the API validators come from one definition instead of two hand-synced ones.src/s3/- R2 presigned URL helpers (PUTfor client uploads,GETfor the edge proxy).src/queue/- Valkey client (ioredis) +XADDhelper pushing ontostream:camera_framesforcontinuum-ai-worker.
Valkey, not Redis: Redis 7.4+ is RSALv2/SSPL and 8.0+ adds AGPLv3, none of
which a commercial product can ship. Valkey is BSD-3-Clause and speaks the
same RESP protocol, so ioredis is unchanged - only the server differs. See
continuum-common/docs/LICENSES.md. docker-compose.yml here brings up
Valkey and Postgres+pgvector for local development.
src/routes/-/auth,/farms,/printers,/jobs, and the edge-gateway WebSocket at/ws/edge/v1. That route's wire format is not defined here: it isschemas/continuum/v1/edge/in continuum-schemas, validated through its TypeBox mirror in@continuum/ts-types, because both ends of it are separate programs in different languages and they had already drifted apart once.printers.gateway_printer_idis what maps a gateway's own printer ids ("p1p") onto rows here; telemetry for an unclaimed id is logged and skipped, never inserted.
frame_embeddings.embedding requires the vector extension. The first
migration creates it, and scripts/dev-env.sh up also does so for the push
path, which does not run migrations.
Dependency pins
elysia, @sinclair/typebox and the drizzle-* packages are pinned tightly
on purpose, not out of caution. Caret ranges here resolved into a combination
that could not boot: elysia: ^1.1.26 installed 1.4.30, which calls
t.Module and so needs TypeBox >=0.34, while drizzle-typebox: ^0.2.1
installed a version whose peers demand drizzle-orm >=0.36 against the
^0.33.0 pinned here. Typechecking passed throughout - only starting the
server failed. tests/dependency_identity.test.ts guards the part of this that
can silently come back.