The hash in a bundle only proved it was undamaged. Anyone who could write the stick could write both files, so a Proxy Box would install a config handed to it by whoever got physical access - including a config pointing the box at a different cloud. Encryption alone does not fix that either. While plaintext was accepted an attacker simply did not encrypt, and the box took it. So a Box now refuses plaintext outright, and the bundle carries a signature. A third entry, `config.toml.sig`: strict TOML with `box_id`, `config_version` and a raw Ed25519 signature. What is signed is `signed_message()` - a domain tag, the length-prefixed box id, the version big-endian, then the raw `config.toml` bytes. Raw bytes rather than the archive, so the signature is independent of ZIP framing, compression, entry order and encryption. The box id and version are inside the signed message rather than beside it, so neither can be edited without breaking it, and the length prefix stops a byte-shifting collision between the id and the config. Past decryption the order is hash, signature, box id, version, then parse and validate. The claims in the `.sig` are attacker-controlled text until the signature over them verifies, so nothing is concluded from them before then - and nothing about this box's identity is revealed before then either, which is why unsigned junk cannot be used to probe which box it is talking to. Which error wins when a box cannot even open a bundle: a signature over the plaintext is only checkable after decryption, so a box with the wrong key cannot distinguish "meant for another box" from "forged". Wrong key wins. Neither bundle installs either way, it is nearly always the true cause, and calling something forged that we could not open would be an accusation we cannot support. Replay is enforced rather than documented away: `config_version` must not go backwards, recorded in a sidecar beside the installed config. An equal version is accepted on purpose, because the version is written before the config, so a power cut between the two leaves "new version, old config" and re-inserting the same stick repairs it. The other write order would leave a replay window instead. Both key sets are lists, so the cloud's signing key and a box's own key can be rotated. `load_provisioning()` is the single seam where a box's identity and keys come from; a TPM or secure element replaces that function and nothing else. A missing file means unprovisioned, and the box then says loudly what it cannot check - but an empty or malformed one is an error, because quietly reading a broken key file as absent would turn a provisioning mistake into a box that accepts unsigned bundles. Not verified: interop with the real cloud signer. These tests prove the box accepts what this code defines as correct, not that the cloud will produce the same bytes - the message layout, the pure-Ed25519-no-prehash choice and the `.sig` shape all need a cross-check against the configurator's own crypto library once it exists. A compromised cloud signing key still breaks every box trusting it; revocation is not built.
continuum-proxy
Edge gateway daemon for the Continuum print farm platform. Runs on a Linux
SBC on-site, talks to printers over the LAN, and keeps a connection to the
cloud control plane (continuum-backend).
What's real right now
- Bambu MQTT - a real client for both protocol generations (MQTT
v3.1.1+BambuMQTT v1 on older firmware, MQTT v5+BambuMQTT v2 on current
firmware), auto-detected per printer on connect (a firmware update can
move the same physical printer between them, so this isn't something
config can hard-code once and forget - see
printer/bambu.rs'sBambuProtocolPreference::Auto). Request/reply correlation viasequence_id, an in-memoryprint.push_statuscache that merges v1's partial updates and replaces on v2's full ones, and TLS trust that auto-pins a printer's certificate via trust-on-first-connect the first time the bundled CA doesn't verify (printer/bambu.rs'sensure_trusted) - seeprinter/bambu_mqtt.rs's doc comment for the full protocol write-up. - Marlin/RepRap serial - a real held-open serial connection that paces
gcode lines by Marlin's own "ok" acknowledgment (
printer/marlin_serial.rs). - Wire shapes from schemas, not hand duplication - Bambu's raw MQTT
JSON is built straight from
continuum-schemas' JSON Schema files viacontinuum-schema-instance, instead of a second hand-written copy of every request shape drifting out of sync with the schema. - Cloud uplink - a WebSocket client to
continuum-backendthat connects, sends a heartbeat on a timer, and reconnects on drop (src/uplink/). - Camera restreaming - generates go2rtc's configuration from the camera
URLs the printers report, and restarts go2rtc when it changes
(
src/camera.rs+src/go2rtc.rs). Only the X1/H2 class publishes an RTSP URL: confirmed against two real machines, an H2C reportsrtsps://<ip>:322/streaming/live/1and a P1P reports a camera with no URL for it. A P1/A1 camera needs Bambu's proprietary port-6000 JPEG stream, which this crate does not speak, so those printers advertise no stream rather than one that will not play. Note the stream is reachable on the gateway's LAN only - there is no relay. - Bambu file upload - implicit FTPS (port 990) into the printer's own
cache/directory (src/printer/bambu_ftps.rs, viaBambuPrinter::upload_file). Confirmed live against a P1P on 2026-10-03: login, binary mode, and the transfer all work, byte count matched exactly. - Print status -
print.push_statusparsed intoPrintReportwith real job progress, temperatures, fans and HMS entries. Confirmed live on both generations (idle P1P on v1, H2C 20% into a job on v2); regression fixtures from those captures are intests/fixtures/.
Examples worth knowing
cargo run --example live_reports [printer-id]- read-only, safe against a printer that is mid-print. Connects, reports firmware, and watches the status stream. Redirect stderr to capture raw payloads.cargo run --example bambu_idle_checks -- <printer-id>- writes (FTPS upload, fan speed). Requires an explicit printer id and refuses to run unless that printer reportsgcode_state: "IDLE".
What routes between the cloud and the printers
The uplink and the printer fleet are wired together, in both directions
(uplink/mod.rs):
- Up: every 5s, one
PrinterTelemetrysnapshot per printer that has reported, batched into a singleTelemetrymessage. Verified live against a P1P and an H2C. - Down: a
Commandfrom the cloud is looked up by our own printer id, executed, and answered with aCommandResult. The set of commands is deliberately small - a fan speed and a single gcode line - and deliberately has no "start a print" variant; seePrinterCommand.
One quirk worth knowing: a Bambu on protocol v1 only sends a complete
status when asked, so each telemetry tick also fires a pushing.pushall for
the next one. A v1 printer's telemetry is therefore one tick behind, which
is why it shows up on the second frame rather than the first.
What's still a stub
start_uploaded_file - the MQTT command that actually starts a print from
an uploaded file - is written but has deliberately never been fired, since
that commits a machine to hours of work. Its doc comment lists the three
details to confirm on the first real attempt. upload_file is proven, but
only with a small text file, not a multi-megabyte sliced .3mf.
PrusaLink (REST) and Klipper/Moonraker (WebSocket) - printer/prusa.rs
and printer/klipper.rs just println! what they'd send. Also not built
yet: local buffering for telemetry across connectivity gaps (so telemetry
produced while the uplink is down is simply lost), LAN printer discovery
(SSDP/mDNS), and the mechanical plate-changer interface.
Getting started
cp .env.example .env
cargo run # the daemon: connects every configured printer, then runs the cloud uplink + go2rtc watchdog
cp printers.example.toml printers.toml # fill in your real printers (gitignored)
cargo run --example auto_connect_bambu # checks/auto-pins each Bambu printer's certificate, no MQTT needed
cargo run --example test_bambu_certs # narrower: just the raw TLS handshake, no auto-pinning
cargo run --example printer_polymorphism # standalone trait+enum demo, fake data, no network/env needed
cargo run --example bambu_commands_demo # round-trips hand-written structs against real captured Bambu JSON
Structure
src/
main.rs Loads+connects the printer fleet, then runs the uplink, camera config, watchdog and completion watcher side by side
config.rs Loads settings from environment variables
fleet.rs Loads printers.toml into ready-to-use PrinterHandles
uplink/ WebSocket client to continuum-backend: connect, heartbeat, reconnect on drop
camera.rs Writes go2rtc's config from the camera URLs the printers report
go2rtc.rs Restarts the go2rtc camera-restreaming process if it dies, or when the config changes
printer/
mod.rs GenericPrinter trait + PrinterBase + PrinterHandle enum - the trait+enum
"inheritance" pattern this project uses instead of class inheritance
bambu.rs The real Bambu printer type: cert trust, protocol version auto-detect, commands
bambu_mqtt.rs The real MQTT wiring underneath bambu.rs - see its doc comment for the protocol details
bambu_commands/ Hand-written serde structs mirroring continuum-schemas' bambulab/ shapes
marlin_serial.rs A real held-open Marlin/RepRap serial connection
prusa.rs, klipper.rs Still stubs - see "What's still a stub" above
examples/
auto_connect_bambu.rs Checks/auto-pins every Bambu printer's certificate (no MQTT)
test_bambu_certs.rs Narrower: just a raw TLS handshake per Bambu printer
printer_polymorphism.rs Standalone trait+enum demo, five fake printers, no network needed
bambu_commands_demo.rs Round-trips bambu_commands' structs against real captured Bambu JSON
printers.toml (gitignored - copy from printers.example.toml) holds real
per-printer connection details: host, access code/API key/serial port
depending on vendor, and - for Bambu - an optional per-printer CA
certificate override (see certs/README.md; most printers don't need one,
since connect() auto-pins automatically).
Learning Rust through this repo
src/printer/mod.rs's doc comment is where the "how do I do inheritance
without classes" question lives - trait (shared behavior) + struct
(shared fields) + enum (the closed set of concrete types), instead of
GenericPrinter -> BambuPrinter/PrusaLinkPrinter/... class inheritance.
Run printer_polymorphism to see it work end to end without needing any
real printer on the network.