The gateway can find printers on its own network and USB ports; nothing carried that back. So adding a printer in the console still began with someone walking to a machine to read its IP address off the screen. Three pieces: - A `discovered_printers` handler on /ws/edge/v1, recording the latest scan per farm. - `discoveredByFarm`, one entry per farm, replaced wholesale by each report. - `GET /farms/:id/discovered-printers`, viewer-gated like its unclaimed sibling. Why a separate store rather than folding this into `unclaimedByFarm`: an unclaimed printer is already in the gateway's `printers.toml`, so someone has written down its address and credential and the gateway is talking to it - all that is missing is the row. A discovered printer was merely seen. Nobody configured it, no credential for it exists anywhere, and the gateway cannot reach it as a printer. One is a row waiting to be created; the other is a suggestion. Keyed per farm rather than per printer because discovery has no stable key to merge on: a Bambu printer has a serial, a Klipper host has only the address DHCP gave it this week, and merging on that accumulates a phantom candidate per lease. The route cross-checks candidates against the farm's existing printer rows so the console can grey one out instead of offering a duplicate - the gateway filters its own fleet file but knows nothing about rows registered in the cloud and never claimed. `matchedOn` reports the basis because the two bases are not equally sure: a serial identifies a machine, an address identifies a DHCP lease and may well be last month's printer. `discovery: null` means the gateway has never reported a scan, which is the normal case because discovery is off by default in the gateway's config. That is deliberately distinguishable from a report whose `printers` is empty, which means it looked and found nothing. The protocol tests pin the parts that matter for safety: an over-long name is refused, and so is a candidate carrying an `access_code`. That second one is not tidiness - no probe can learn an access code, so a candidate that has one got it elsewhere, and the closed object is what stops this message quietly becoming a channel for secrets nobody meant to send to the cloud.
311 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
311 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import { Elysia, t } from "elysia";
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import { and, desc, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { NotFoundError } from "@continuum/ts-core";
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import { db } from "../db";
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import { farms, printers } from "../db/schema";
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import { farmProjection } from "../db/projections";
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import { requireFarm, requireOrg, requireUser, visibleFarms } from "../auth";
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import { PaginationQuery, paginate } from "./pagination";
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import { getDiscoveredPrinters, isGatewayOnline, listUnclaimedPrinters } from "./ws/edge";
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const IdParams = t.Object({ id: t.String({ format: "uuid" }) });
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export const farmRoutes = new Elysia({ prefix: "/farms" })
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.use(requireUser)
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/**
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* Farms in the caller's organisations. The scoping is in the `where`, not
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* applied to the result afterwards: a filter that runs after the query is
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* one `return` away from being skipped, and it also makes the database read
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* rows it is not allowed to show.
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*
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* A projection rather than `select *`, because the table holds
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* `edgeProxyToken`, which trades for an edge JWT - see src/db/projections.ts.
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*/
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.get(
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"/",
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async ({ user, query }) => {
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const scope = query.orgId
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? and(visibleFarms(user.id), eq(farms.orgId, query.orgId))
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: visibleFarms(user.id);
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return db.query.farms.findMany({
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columns: farmProjection.columns,
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where: scope,
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orderBy: [desc(farms.createdAt)],
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...paginate(query),
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});
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},
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{
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query: t.Object({
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orgId: t.Optional(t.String({ format: "uuid" })),
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...PaginationQuery,
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}),
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detail: { tags: ["farms"], summary: "Farms in the caller's organisations" },
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},
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)
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.get(
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"/:id",
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async ({ user, params }) => {
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const { role } = await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "viewer");
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const farm = await db.query.farms.findFirst({
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columns: farmProjection.columns,
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where: eq(farms.id, params.id),
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});
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if (!farm) throw new NotFoundError(`Farm ${params.id} not found`);
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return { ...farm, role };
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},
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{ params: IdParams, detail: { tags: ["farms"] } },
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)
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.post(
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"/",
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async ({ user, body, set }) => {
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// `orgId` comes from the body and is then authorized, which is the
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// right way round: the caller says where the farm should go, and the
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// check is whether they own that organisation. What must never come
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// from the body is *who the caller is* - that is `user.id`, from a
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// verified token, and it is why there is no `ownerId` field here any
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// more.
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await requireOrg(user.id, body.orgId, "owner", "creating a farm");
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// The generated token is deliberately not returned. A farm is created
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// far more often than a gateway is provisioned, and a credential that
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// comes back from a routine create ends up in logs, browser history and
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// screenshots. Fetch it when a gateway actually needs it, below.
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const [farm] = await db
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.insert(farms)
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.values({
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name: body.name,
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orgId: body.orgId,
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edgeProxyToken: crypto.randomUUID(),
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location: body.location,
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})
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.returning(farmProjection.returning);
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set.status = 201;
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return farm;
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},
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{
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body: t.Object({
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name: t.String({ minLength: 1, maxLength: 200 }),
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orgId: t.String({ format: "uuid" }),
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location: t.Optional(t.String({ maxLength: 500 })),
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}),
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detail: { tags: ["farms"] },
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},
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)
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.patch(
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"/:id",
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async ({ user, params, body }) => {
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await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "owner", "editing a farm");
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// `orgId` is not patchable here on purpose: moving a farm between
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// organisations changes who can see its print history and would need
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// the `owner` role in *both*, so it wants its own endpoint rather than
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// a field on a general update.
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const [farm] = await db
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.update(farms)
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.set({ ...body, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(farms.id, params.id))
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.returning(farmProjection.returning);
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if (!farm) throw new NotFoundError(`Farm ${params.id} not found`);
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return farm;
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},
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{
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params: IdParams,
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body: t.Object({
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name: t.Optional(t.String({ minLength: 1, maxLength: 200 })),
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location: t.Optional(t.String({ maxLength: 500 })),
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settings: t.Optional(t.Record(t.String(), t.Unknown())),
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}),
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detail: { tags: ["farms"] },
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},
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)
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.delete(
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"/:id",
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async ({ user, params }) => {
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await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "owner", "deleting a farm");
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// Cascades to the farm's printers and print jobs, per the schema's
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// foreign keys. Worth knowing before calling it.
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await db.delete(farms).where(eq(farms.id, params.id));
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return { deleted: params.id };
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},
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{ params: IdParams, detail: { tags: ["farms"] } },
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)
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/**
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* Issues a *new* `edgeProxyToken` for this farm and returns it once.
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*
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* The only route that ever returns that credential, and it rotates on every
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* call rather than revealing the stored one: a reveal endpoint returns the
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* same secret to everyone who asks and leaves no trace of having been
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* called, while a rotate endpoint makes the old value useless, so a
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* gateway's token leaking has a bounded blast radius and reprovisioning is
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* the fix.
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*
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* The cost is that rotating locks out the gateway currently using the old
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* token until it is reconfigured, which is the right trade for a credential
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* that drives physical machines - but it does mean this is not a "show me
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* the token" button.
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*/
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.post(
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"/:id/edge-proxy-token",
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async ({ user, params }) => {
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await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "owner", "rotating a farm's gateway credential");
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const token = crypto.randomUUID();
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const [farm] = await db
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.update(farms)
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.set({ edgeProxyToken: token, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(farms.id, params.id))
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.returning({ id: farms.id });
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if (!farm) throw new NotFoundError(`Farm ${params.id} not found`);
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return {
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farmId: farm.id,
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edgeProxyToken: token,
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note: "Any gateway still using the previous token must be reconfigured.",
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};
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},
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{
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params: IdParams,
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detail: {
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tags: ["farms"],
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summary: "Rotate and return this farm's edge-proxy token (owner only)",
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},
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},
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)
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/**
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* Printers this farm's gateway can see that no printer row claims.
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*
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* This exists because of the worst first-run experience in the platform.
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* A gateway reports its fleet by the ids in its own `printers.toml`, and
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* `persistTelemetry` refuses to create rows for ids it does not recognise -
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* correctly, since a typo there would otherwise become a permanent phantom
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* printer that nobody can explain. But the refusal used to be silent, so a
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* new owner saw a connected gateway, an empty fleet, and no way to find out
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* why. The answer was in the server's stderr.
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*
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* Now it is here. Claim one by creating it with `POST /printers`, passing
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* the `gatewayPrinterId` from this list; the next telemetry batch fills in
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* everything else and the entry disappears from here.
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*
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* `viewer`, not `owner`: this reports what hardware exists, which is the
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* same class of fact as the printer list itself. Creating the row still
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* needs `owner`.
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*
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* `gatewayOnline` is in the response because an empty list is ambiguous on
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* its own - it means either "everything is claimed" or "no gateway has ever
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* connected", and those need completely different things done about them.
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*/
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.get(
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"/:id/unclaimed-printers",
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async ({ user, params }) => {
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await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "viewer");
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return {
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farmId: params.id,
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gatewayOnline: isGatewayOnline(params.id),
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unclaimed: listUnclaimedPrinters(params.id),
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};
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},
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{
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params: IdParams,
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detail: {
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tags: ["farms"],
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summary: "Printers the gateway reports that no printer row claims yet",
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},
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},
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)
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/**
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* Printers the gateway *found* on its own network and USB ports, which is
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* a different thing from the list above.
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*
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* An unclaimed printer is in the gateway's fleet file already: its address
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* and credential were written down by hand, and only the printer row is
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* missing. A discovered one was merely seen. The point of it is that
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* adding a printer should not start with someone walking to a machine to
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* read its IP address off the screen.
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*
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* What a candidate cannot carry is a credential, and no amount of probing
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* will change that: a Bambu access code lives on the printer's display and
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* a PrusaLink API key in its web UI. So this shortens the job rather than
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* removing it - the operator still types one secret, instead of a secret
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* and an address and a serial number.
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*
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* `null` for `discovery` is the normal answer, and means the gateway has
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* never reported a scan - almost always because discovery is off, which is
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* its default. That is not the same as a report with an empty `printers`,
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* which means the gateway looked and found nothing.
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*
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* `viewer`, like the list above and for the same reason: this reports what
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* hardware exists. Creating the row still needs `owner`.
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*/
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.get(
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"/:id/discovered-printers",
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async ({ user, params }) => {
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await requireFarm(user.id, params.id, "viewer");
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const discovery = getDiscoveredPrinters(params.id);
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const gatewayOnline = isGatewayOnline(params.id);
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if (!discovery) {
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return { farmId: params.id, gatewayOnline, discovery: null };
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}
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// Cross-check against the rows this farm already has, so the console
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// can grey out a candidate instead of offering a duplicate. The
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// gateway filters its own fleet file before reporting, but it knows
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// nothing about printer rows registered in the cloud and never
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// claimed, which is exactly the case that produces a confusing
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// "add" button for a printer the operator already added.
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const existing = await db
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.select({
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id: printers.id,
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serialNumber: printers.serialNumber,
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lanAddress: printers.lanAddress,
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})
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.from(printers)
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.where(eq(printers.farmId, params.id));
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const bySerial = new Map<string, string>();
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const byAddress = new Map<string, string>();
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for (const row of existing) {
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if (row.serialNumber) bySerial.set(row.serialNumber.toLowerCase(), row.id);
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if (row.lanAddress) byAddress.set(row.lanAddress.toLowerCase(), row.id);
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}
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return {
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farmId: params.id,
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gatewayOnline,
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discovery: {
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scannedAt: discovery.scannedAt,
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reportedAt: discovery.reportedAt,
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gatewayId: discovery.gatewayId,
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printers: discovery.printers.map((candidate) => {
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const bySerialMatch = candidate.serial
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? bySerial.get(candidate.serial.toLowerCase())
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: undefined;
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const byAddressMatch = byAddress.get(candidate.address.toLowerCase());
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return {
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...candidate,
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/**
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* The printer row this candidate looks like, or null.
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*
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* `matchedOn` says how sure that is, and the two are not
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* equally sure. A serial number identifies a machine. An
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* address identifies a DHCP lease, so an address match can
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* be the printer that held that address last month - which
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* is why the basis is reported instead of just a boolean,
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* and why the console should warn on `address` rather than
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* refuse to add.
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*/
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existingPrinterId: bySerialMatch ?? byAddressMatch ?? null,
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matchedOn: bySerialMatch ? "serial" : byAddressMatch ? "address" : null,
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};
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}),
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},
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};
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},
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{
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params: IdParams,
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detail: {
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tags: ["farms"],
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summary: "Printers the gateway found on its network that are not in its fleet",
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},
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},
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);
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