octoturge
51e1827f5a
`printers.access_code` held a printer's LAN password - the same value Bambu uses for MQTT and as the FTPS password. It was writable through `POST /printers`, excluded from `printerProjection` so it could not leave the server, and **never read by any backend code path**. A secret at rest in the cloud, serving no purpose. The credential belongs on the proxy, which is the only thing that uses it. Under the three-tier architecture it goes FE -> API -> proxy, with the API relaying it rather than persisting it. Considered and rejected, deliberately: keeping the column so the console could show an operator their printer's access code. Useful, but not worth the risk. Removing the column is what makes that rejection real - a stored secret is one a future route can leak, and the projection was the only thing standing between this column and a response. `PRINTER_WRITABLE` and the two schemas derived from it move to `db/validators.ts`, which already declares itself the single place these shapes are defined. The reason is testability: a route imports `db/index.ts` and so needs a live `DATABASE_URL`, and "what may a client set" is exactly the kind of thing worth asserting with no database in sight. Four tests pin the decision so it is enforced rather than remembered, because a column is easy to re-add and the symptom would be silent. One of them records a hole rather than a fix: `metadata` is a free-form jsonb column that is both writable and in the public projection, so a well-meaning client can still stash a credential there and have it stored and served back. Removing the dedicated column narrowed the door; it did not close it. The e2e script still submits `accessCode: "SECRET123"` on purpose. The field is now unknown to the create schema, the schema is open, and Elysia cleans it away rather than rejecting the request - so the canary proves against a real server that a client which tries to hand the cloud a credential has it dropped and never echoed. That is runtime behaviour the unit test can only establish at the schema level. Migration 0003 is a single `DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS`, applied locally. There is no production, staging or dev environment and nothing was writing the column, so there is no data to preserve and no consumer to break.
331 lines
15 KiB
Bash
Executable File
331 lines
15 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# End-to-end test of authentication and the org -> farm -> printer
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# authorization chain, against a real database and the real HTTP routes.
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#
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# This is the test that the unit tests cannot be. tests/authz.test.ts proves
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# tokens are verified and that the role ladder orders correctly; only this
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# proves that each route actually asks, that scoping is applied in the query
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# rather than after it, and that credentials stay out of responses - the three
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# things that were wrong when every route was unauthenticated.
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#
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# Four users, two organisations, no printers or gateways needed:
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# owner_a, operator_a, viewer_a in org A, which owns farm A and printer A
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# outsider_b in org B, which owns nothing
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#
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# Usage:
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# scripts/dev-env.sh up && scripts/dev-env.sh schema
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# scripts/e2e-authz.sh
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#
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# KEEP_DATA=1 leave the seeded organisations behind for inspection
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set -euo pipefail
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REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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cd "$REPO_ROOT"
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PORT="${PORT:-3020}"
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AUTH_PORT="${AUTH_PORT:-3021}"
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BASE="http://localhost:$PORT"
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DATABASE_URL="${DATABASE_URL:-postgres://continuum:continuum@localhost:5432/continuum}"
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VALKEY_URL="${VALKEY_URL:-redis://localhost:6379}"
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EDGE_JWT_SECRET="${EDGE_JWT_SECRET:-e2e-edge-secret}"
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# Presigning a PUT is local HMAC with no network call, so POST /jobs works
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# offline - but the SDK refuses to sign with empty credentials.
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R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID="${R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID:-e2e}"
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R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="${R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:-e2e}"
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R2_ENDPOINT="${R2_ENDPOINT:-http://localhost:9000}"
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export DATABASE_URL VALKEY_URL EDGE_JWT_SECRET PORT
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export R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY R2_ENDPOINT
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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BACKEND_PID=""
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AUTH_PID=""
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FAILURES=0
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# `uuidgen` is not installed everywhere; the kernel's generator always is.
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new_uuid() {
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if [ -r /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid ]; then
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cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid
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else
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python3 -c 'import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4())'
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fi
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}
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psql_q() { PGPASSWORD=continuum psql -h localhost -U continuum -d continuum -tAq -c "$1"; }
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cleanup() {
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local rc=$?
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# Never `kill $PID` with an unset PID: `kill 0` signals the whole process
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# group, which includes this script and whatever launched it.
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local pids=()
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[ -n "$BACKEND_PID" ] && pids+=("$BACKEND_PID")
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[ -n "$AUTH_PID" ] && pids+=("$AUTH_PID")
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if [ ${#pids[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
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kill "${pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
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sleep 0.3
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kill -9 "${pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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if [ -z "${KEEP_DATA:-}" ]; then
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for org in "${ORG_A:-}" "${ORG_B:-}"; do
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[ -n "$org" ] && psql_q "DELETE FROM organisations WHERE id = '$org'" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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done
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fi
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if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
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echo
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echo "--- backend log (tail) ---"; tail -30 "$WORK/backend.log" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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rm -rf "$WORK"
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exit $rc
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
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ok() { echo " ok: $*"; }
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bad() { echo " FAILED: $*" >&2; FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1)); }
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# `req <method> <path> <token|-> [json body]` -> prints the status code,
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# leaves the response body in $WORK/last.json.
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req() {
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local method="$1" path="$2" token="$3" body="${4:-}"
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local args=(-s -o "$WORK/last.json" -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "$BASE$path")
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[ "$token" != "-" ] && args+=(-H "authorization: Bearer $token")
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[ -n "$body" ] && args+=(-H 'content-type: application/json' -d "$body")
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curl "${args[@]}"
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}
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# `expect <code> <method> <path> <token> [body] -- <description>`
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expect() {
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local want="$1"; shift
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local method="$1" path="$2" token="$3"; shift 3
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local body=""
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if [ "${1:-}" != "--" ]; then body="$1"; shift; fi
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shift # the --
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local what="$*"
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local got; got="$(req "$method" "$path" "$token" "$body")"
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if [ "$got" = "$want" ]; then
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ok "$what ($got)"
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else
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bad "$what: expected $want, got $got - $(head -c 300 "$WORK/last.json")"
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fi
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}
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body_has() { grep -q "$1" "$WORK/last.json" || bad "expected '$1' in: $(head -c 300 "$WORK/last.json")"; }
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body_lacks() { grep -q "$1" "$WORK/last.json" && bad "'$1' leaked into: $(head -c 300 "$WORK/last.json")" || true; }
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json() { python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print($1)" < "$WORK/last.json"; }
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# --- 0. preconditions ------------------------------------------------------
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echo "==> checking the database is up and migrated"
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psql_q "SELECT 1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "no database at $DATABASE_URL - run scripts/dev-env.sh up"
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psql_q "SELECT org_id FROM farms LIMIT 0" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| fail "farms.org_id is missing - run scripts/dev-env.sh schema"
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psql_q "SELECT role FROM org_members LIMIT 0" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| fail "org_members is missing - run scripts/dev-env.sh schema"
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ok "schema has the org layer"
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# --- 1. the issuer and the backend ----------------------------------------
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echo "==> starting the dev-auth JWKS issuer on :$AUTH_PORT"
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bun scripts/dev-auth.ts --port "$AUTH_PORT" > "$WORK/auth.log" 2>&1 &
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AUTH_PID=$!
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AUTH_URL="http://localhost:$AUTH_PORT"
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for _ in $(seq 1 40); do
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curl -sf "$AUTH_URL/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
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sleep 0.25
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done
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curl -sf "$AUTH_URL/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| fail "the dev-auth issuer did not come up: $(cat "$WORK/auth.log")"
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export SUPABASE_URL="$AUTH_URL"
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ok "issuer up, SUPABASE_URL=$SUPABASE_URL"
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mint() { curl -sf "$AUTH_URL/token?sub=$1" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])'; }
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OWNER_A_ID="$(new_uuid)"; OWNER_A="$(mint "$OWNER_A_ID")"
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OPERATOR_A_ID="$(new_uuid)"; OPERATOR_A="$(mint "$OPERATOR_A_ID")"
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VIEWER_A_ID="$(new_uuid)"; VIEWER_A="$(mint "$VIEWER_A_ID")"
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OUTSIDER_ID="$(new_uuid)"; OUTSIDER="$(mint "$OUTSIDER_ID")"
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ok "minted four access tokens"
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echo "==> starting continuum-backend on :$PORT"
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bun run src/index.ts > "$WORK/backend.log" 2>&1 &
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BACKEND_PID=$!
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for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
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curl -sf "$BASE/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
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sleep 0.5
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done
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curl -sf "$BASE/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "backend did not become healthy: $(cat "$WORK/backend.log")"
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ok "backend healthy"
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# --- 2. anonymous access --------------------------------------------------
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echo "==> nothing works without a token"
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expect 200 GET /health - -- "GET /health is public"
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expect 401 GET /orgs - -- "GET /orgs rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 GET /farms - -- "GET /farms rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 GET /printers - -- "GET /printers rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 GET /jobs - -- "GET /jobs rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 GET /auth/session - -- "GET /auth/session rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 POST /farms - '{"name":"x","orgId":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}' -- "POST /farms rejects anonymous"
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expect 401 GET /farms -H.invalid.token -- "a malformed token is rejected"
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# --- 3. the seeded world --------------------------------------------------
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echo "==> building org A (via the API, as owner_a)"
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expect 201 POST /orgs "$OWNER_A" '{"name":"e2e org A"}' -- "owner_a creates org A"
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ORG_A="$(json 'd["id"]')"
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body_has '"role":"owner"'
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ok "org A = $ORG_A, creator is its owner"
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expect 200 GET /auth/session "$OWNER_A" -- "owner_a reads their session"
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body_has "$ORG_A"
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expect 200 PUT "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OPERATOR_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" '{"role":"operator"}' -- "owner_a adds operator_a"
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expect 200 PUT "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$VIEWER_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" '{"role":"viewer"}' -- "owner_a adds viewer_a"
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expect 201 POST /farms "$OWNER_A" "{\"name\":\"e2e farm A\",\"orgId\":\"$ORG_A\"}" -- "owner_a creates farm A"
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FARM_A="$(json 'd["id"]')"
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body_lacks edgeProxyToken
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ok "farm A = $FARM_A, and the create response carries no proxy token"
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# `accessCode` is deliberately still sent, even though the column was removed
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# (2026-10-19) and the field is now unknown to the create schema. That is the
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# point: a client that believes it can hand the cloud a printer's LAN password
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# must have it dropped and never see it again. The schema is open, so the
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# field validates and Elysia cleans it away rather than rejecting the request
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# - which is behaviour worth proving against a real server, not just against
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# the schema (see the credentials block in tests/authz.test.ts).
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expect 201 POST /printers "$OWNER_A" \
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"{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"name\":\"e2e printer A\",\"vendor\":\"bambu\",\"accessCode\":\"SECRET123\",\"serialNumber\":\"SN-SECRET\"}" \
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-- "owner_a adds printer A, trying to set an access code"
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PRINTER_A="$(json 'd["id"]')"
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body_lacks SECRET123
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ok "printer A = $PRINTER_A, and the submitted access code was dropped, not echoed"
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echo "==> building org B (via the API, as the outsider)"
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expect 201 POST /orgs "$OUTSIDER" '{"name":"e2e org B"}' -- "outsider creates their own org B"
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ORG_B="$(json 'd["id"]')"
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# --- 4. scoping: a list shows only your own ------------------------------
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echo "==> lists are scoped to the caller's organisations"
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expect 200 GET /farms "$VIEWER_A" -- "viewer_a lists farms"
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body_has "$FARM_A"
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expect 200 GET /farms "$OUTSIDER" -- "the outsider lists farms"
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body_lacks "$FARM_A"
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ok "the outsider's farm list does not contain farm A"
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expect 200 GET /printers "$OUTSIDER" -- "the outsider lists printers"
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body_lacks "$PRINTER_A"
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ok "the outsider's printer list does not contain printer A"
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expect 200 GET /orgs "$OUTSIDER" -- "the outsider lists organisations"
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body_lacks "$ORG_A"
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ok "the outsider cannot see org A exists"
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# --- 5. a non-member gets 404, not 403 -----------------------------------
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echo "==> a non-member cannot distinguish 'forbidden' from 'does not exist'"
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expect 404 GET "/farms/$FARM_A" "$OUTSIDER" -- "GET another org's farm"
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expect 404 GET "/printers/$PRINTER_A" "$OUTSIDER" -- "GET another org's printer"
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expect 404 GET "/orgs/$ORG_A" "$OUTSIDER" -- "GET another org"
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expect 404 GET "/orgs/$ORG_A/members" "$OUTSIDER" -- "GET another org's members"
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expect 404 DELETE "/farms/$FARM_A" "$OUTSIDER" -- "DELETE another org's farm"
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expect 404 PATCH "/printers/$PRINTER_A" "$OUTSIDER" '{"name":"hijacked"}' -- "PATCH another org's printer"
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expect 404 PUT "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OUTSIDER_ID" "$OUTSIDER" '{"role":"owner"}' -- "add themselves to another org"
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expect 404 POST "/farms/$FARM_A/edge-proxy-token" "$OUTSIDER" -- "rotate another farm's gateway credential"
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expect 404 POST "/printers/$PRINTER_A/commands" "$OUTSIDER" '{"action":"set_fan_speed","percent":100}' \
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-- "command another org's printer"
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# The same id, as a member: proves the 404s above are about membership and not
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# about the farm being missing or the route being broken.
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expect 200 GET "/farms/$FARM_A" "$VIEWER_A" -- "the same farm id, as a member of its org"
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# --- 6. the role ladder, over HTTP ---------------------------------------
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echo "==> roles gate what a member can do"
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expect 200 GET "/printers/$PRINTER_A" "$VIEWER_A" -- "a viewer reads a printer"
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expect 403 POST "/printers/$PRINTER_A/commands" "$VIEWER_A" '{"action":"set_fan_speed","percent":100}' \
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-- "a viewer cannot command a printer"
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body_has FORBIDDEN
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# 409 PRINTER_UNREACHABLE, not 403: no gateway is connected in this test, so
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# authorization passing is exactly what reaching that error means.
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expect 409 POST "/printers/$PRINTER_A/commands" "$OPERATOR_A" '{"action":"set_fan_speed","percent":100}' \
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-- "an operator passes authorization and fails on delivery"
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body_has PRINTER_UNREACHABLE
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expect 403 POST "/jobs" "$VIEWER_A" "{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"fileName\":\"v.3mf\"}" -- "a viewer cannot submit a job"
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expect 201 POST "/jobs" "$OPERATOR_A" "{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"fileName\":\"o.3mf\"}" -- "an operator submits a job"
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JOB_A="$(json 'd["job"]["id"]')"
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SUBMITTER="$(json 'd["job"]["submittedBy"]')"
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[ "$SUBMITTER" = "$OPERATOR_A_ID" ] \
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&& ok "submittedBy came from the token, not the body ($SUBMITTER)" \
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|| bad "submittedBy is '$SUBMITTER', expected '$OPERATOR_A_ID'"
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# The old route took `submittedBy` from the body. Sending it now must not
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# change the recorded submitter - an ignored extra field, not an override.
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expect 201 POST "/jobs" "$OPERATOR_A" \
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"{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"fileName\":\"spoof.3mf\",\"submittedBy\":\"$OWNER_A_ID\"}" \
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-- "a job body claiming another submitter"
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SPOOFED="$(json 'd["job"]["submittedBy"]')"
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[ "$SPOOFED" = "$OPERATOR_A_ID" ] \
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&& ok "a spoofed submittedBy in the body is ignored" \
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|| bad "the body overrode submittedBy: got '$SPOOFED'"
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expect 403 PATCH "/farms/$FARM_A" "$OPERATOR_A" '{"name":"renamed by operator"}' -- "an operator cannot rename a farm"
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expect 200 PATCH "/farms/$FARM_A" "$OWNER_A" '{"name":"e2e farm A renamed"}' -- "an owner can rename a farm"
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expect 403 POST "/printers" "$OPERATOR_A" "{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"name\":\"nope\",\"vendor\":\"bambu\"}" \
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-- "an operator cannot add a printer"
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# --- 7. credentials stay on the server ------------------------------------
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echo "==> credentials never appear in an ordinary response"
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expect 200 GET "/farms/$FARM_A" "$OWNER_A" -- "an owner fetches their own farm"
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body_lacks edgeProxyToken
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expect 200 GET /farms "$OWNER_A" -- "an owner lists their farms"
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body_lacks edgeProxyToken
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expect 200 GET "/printers/$PRINTER_A" "$OWNER_A" -- "an owner fetches their own printer"
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body_lacks SECRET123
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body_lacks accessCode
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ok "no proxy token and no access code in any read"
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echo "==> rotation is owner-only, and returns the new value exactly once"
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expect 403 POST "/farms/$FARM_A/edge-proxy-token" "$OPERATOR_A" -- "an operator cannot rotate"
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expect 200 POST "/farms/$FARM_A/edge-proxy-token" "$OWNER_A" -- "an owner rotates"
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ROTATED="$(json 'd["edgeProxyToken"]')"
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[ -n "$ROTATED" ] || bad "rotation returned no token"
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STORED="$(psql_q "SELECT edge_proxy_token FROM farms WHERE id='$FARM_A'")"
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[ "$ROTATED" = "$STORED" ] && ok "the returned token is the one now stored" || bad "rotation did not persist"
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# And it still works for what it is for.
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CODE="$(req POST /auth/edge-token - "{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"edgeProxyToken\":\"$ROTATED\"}")"
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[ "$CODE" = "200" ] && ok "the rotated token still mints an edge JWT (no user token needed)" \
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|| bad "POST /auth/edge-token returned $CODE for the rotated token"
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expect 401 POST /auth/edge-token - "{\"farmId\":\"$FARM_A\",\"edgeProxyToken\":\"not-the-token\"}" \
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-- "a wrong proxy token is refused"
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# --- 8. the guards that stop an org becoming unadministrable --------------
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echo "==> an organisation cannot be left without an owner"
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expect 409 DELETE "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OWNER_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" -- "the only owner cannot remove themselves"
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expect 409 PUT "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OWNER_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" '{"role":"viewer"}' -- "the only owner cannot demote themselves"
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expect 409 DELETE "/orgs/$ORG_A" "$OWNER_A" -- "an org with farms attached cannot be deleted"
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body_has CONFLICT
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expect 200 PUT "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OPERATOR_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" '{"role":"owner"}' -- "promote a second owner"
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expect 200 DELETE "/orgs/$ORG_A/members/$OWNER_A_ID" "$OWNER_A" -- "now the first owner may leave"
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expect 404 GET "/orgs/$ORG_A" "$OWNER_A" -- "and immediately loses access to the org"
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# --- 9. pagination is bounded --------------------------------------------
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echo "==> list endpoints are bounded"
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expect 422 GET "/jobs?limit=10000" "$OPERATOR_A" -- "an oversized limit is refused, not silently clamped"
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expect 200 GET "/jobs?limit=1" "$OPERATOR_A" -- "a limit of 1 is honoured"
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COUNT="$(json 'len(d)')"
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[ "$COUNT" = "1" ] && ok "one row returned" || bad "limit=1 returned $COUNT rows"
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echo
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if [ "$FAILURES" -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "PASS - authentication, org scoping, the role ladder and credential"
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echo " containment all verified against a real database."
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else
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echo "FAIL - $FAILURES assertion(s) failed." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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