4de0d86d437641e831495fd133b51ebdfccfa225
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 octoturge
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b42cbac299
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Fix the frame producer's field names, and pipeline the batch
The other end of the `stream:camera_frames` drift. This side wrote `farmId`, `printerId`, `printJobId`, `r2ObjectKey` and `capturedAt`; `continuum-ai-worker` read `printer_id` and nothing else. Every task was delivered and acknowledged, and every frame was attributed to a printer called "unknown", with no error on either side - a stream entry is a flat string map, so there is nothing to parse and nothing to fail. The field names are now snake_case, from `schemas/continuum/v1/ai/frame_task.schema.json`. That is the convention this repo already follows for anything shared with a Rust consumer (see `/ws/edge/v1`), and it is not an inconsistency with the camelCase HTTP routes: this is not an HTTP route. `print_job_id` is omitted from the XADD when there is no job rather than written as `""`. An empty string is a value: a consumer that believes it looks up job id `""`, or puts it in a uuid column. A stream entry has no null, so "no value" has to mean "no field". The producer checks each task against the shared schema before writing it. The check is not for the database's sake - a stream accepts any field name - it is to make this exact class of drift loud. It earned its keep immediately by failing on every task with `Unknown format 'uuid'`: TypeBox ships no format validators and treats an *unregistered* format as a failure rather than skipping it, so a schema using `format: "uuid"` checked outside Elysia rejects everything. `src/validation/formats.ts` registers the two this codebase uses, guarded by `Has` so Elysia's own registrations still win for the route validators. (The HTTP routes were never affected - importing Elysia registers ~24 formats including `uuid`, which I confirmed by asserting a non-uuid body gets a 422.) A `frame_batch` now goes onto the stream in one pipelined round trip instead of one per frame, which was a round trip each while holding up the WebSocket message handler - and a farm produces roughly a frame per printer per second. ioredis reports per-command pipeline errors in the result tuple rather than throwing, so those are checked explicitly; a pipeline where one XADD failed otherwise looks like success. `frameTaskToStreamFields` and the compiled check live in their own module because `src/queue/index.ts` opens a Valkey connection on import. Keeping the wire format pure means `tests/frame_task_contract.test.ts` asserts it with nothing running. Tests, mirroring the worker's own so neither side can agree only with itself: the exact key set, values carried through unchanged, `print_job_id` present when there is a job and the key absent when there is not, no camelCase key ever emitted, and the uuid and date-time formats actually enforced - that last one fails if the format registration is lost (everything rejected) or becomes a no-op (nothing rejected). Plus `PrintAlertSchema`, which this repo will have to parse once the fan-out route exists. `scripts/e2e-ai-frames.sh` runs this producer against the real worker binary over real Valkey and asserts the field names by reading them back out of Valkey - rather than from either side's source, which is what made the original bug invisible. Two faults in the first draft of that script, both worth naming because a test that passes for the wrong reason is worse than no test: it stranded *every* entry on a dead consumer, so the ordinary delivery path was never exercised at all; and it grepped the subscriber output for "print_alert", which matched `redis-cli`'s own subscription confirmation line and reported a published alert that did not exist. |
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octoturge
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d8f8653dee
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Authenticate and authorize every route: org layer + Supabase JWKS
Until now every HTTP route was unauthenticated. A probe against the
running server returned a farm's `edgeProxyToken` and a printer's
`accessCode` to an anonymous caller, and that pair is enough to connect
as a farm's gateway and drive its printers. The previous commit stopped
the credentials appearing in responses; this one makes the routes ask
who is calling.
Authentication. Access tokens are verified against the Supabase
project's published JWKS via `createSupabaseJwtVerifier` from
`@continuum/ts-core`: RS256, public key only, no secret in this
process. It replaces the HS256 `@elysiajs/jwt` path, where
`SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET` was simultaneously the verification key and a
key that could mint tokens, present in the environment of every
instance. `src/auth/verifier.ts` builds it at module load so a
misconfigured deployment fails at boot rather than on first login.
The edge-gateway token stays symmetric and that is not an
inconsistency: this service is both its issuer and its only verifier,
so there is no second party to keep a secret from. It now carries an
`exp`, which it did not, despite the response saying
`expiresInSeconds: 3600`.
Tenancy. An org layer above farms - `organisations`,
`org_members(org_id, user_id, role)`, `farms.org_id` - so a farm can
have more than one operator without sharing an account. `farms.owner_id`
is gone. Authorization is one rule applied everywhere: resolve the
thing being acted on back to an organisation and check the caller's
role there, user -> org -> farm -> printer, with nothing in between
carrying permissions of its own. The ladder is
`viewer` < `operator` < `owner`; printer commands and job submission
need `operator`, because they move physical machines, and that is the
one boundary here that is not about data.
A non-member gets 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm that a given farm
or printer id exists and belongs to someone, which is an enumeration
oracle over the whole system. 403 is kept for a member who may see the
record but not do this to it.
List endpoints scope in the `where` clause, not after the query - a
filter applied to the result is one `return` away from being skipped.
They are also bounded now (`limit`/`offset`, default 50, max 200
refused rather than clamped).
`ownerId` and `submittedBy` no longer come from request bodies. Nor do
the printer telemetry columns: `POST /printers` is narrowed to the
columns a client owns, because a client that could POST
`status: "idle"` could make the scheduler send work to a printer that
is mid-print.
Also fills the CRUD gaps that made the API unusable - PATCH and DELETE
for farms, printers, jobs and orgs, and membership management - plus
one error shape for the whole API via `toErrorResponse`, so an
authorization failure is a throw that leaves the handler rather than a
status somebody has to remember to set.
Guards on the two changes that cannot be undone through the API:
removing or demoting an organisation's last owner, and deleting an
organisation while farms are still attached (it would cascade to every
printer, print job and stored frame).
Migration 0001 is hand-edited after generation. drizzle-kit emitted
`ADD COLUMN org_id uuid NOT NULL`, which cannot apply to a populated
table, and dropped `owner_id` without moving what it encodes anywhere.
It now adds the column nullable, creates one organisation per distinct
legacy owner with that user as its `owner` member, points each farm at
it, and only then tightens the column and drops `owner_id`. Verified
both ways: from empty via `drizzle-kit migrate`, and against a seeded
database where two farms shared an owner and a third did not.
Testing. `scripts/dev-auth.ts` is a local RS256 issuer publishing a
JWKS at the path the backend fetches, so the real verification path is
testable without a Supabase project. The alternative was a test-only
bypass in the backend - an env var making it trust an unsigned token -
which would be a permanent hole one misconfiguration from production,
and would mean the code under test is not the code that ships.
- `tests/authz.test.ts` (19 tests): the role ladder written out in full
rather than derived the same way the implementation derives it, and
the real JWKS path - a token signed by a key outside the JWKS, an
expired token and a token with `aud: "anon"` (Supabase's own anon key
is a valid project JWT) are all rejected, with the same message, so
probing cannot tell which part of a forged token to fix next.
- `scripts/e2e-authz.sh` (68 assertions, real Postgres, real routes):
four users across two organisations; anonymous 401s, cross-org 404s,
viewer-cannot-command, operator-cannot-rotate, a spoofed
`submittedBy` in the body ignored, no credential in any read, and the
rotated token still minting an edge JWT.
- `scripts/e2e-edge.sh` updated for the org layer and now authenticates
as a seeded `operator` - the weakest role that should work, so the
run would fail if the command boundary were not where it claims to
be. Re-verified against both live printers: telemetry from `h2c` and
`p1p` persisted, and an authenticated `set_fan_speed` went
HTTP -> WebSocket -> MQTT -> P1P and back `ok:true`, fan returned
to 0.
Two bugs found in the test scripts while writing this, both the same
shape as the earlier `pkill -f` incident: `kill "${PID:-0}"` with an
unset PID signals the whole process group, including the harness, and
`uuidgen` is not installed in this sandbox.
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octoturge
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d827b465cf
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Commit the first migration, and apply schema the same way everywhere
`drizzle/` was gitignored, so every environment re-derived the schema from src/db/schema and nothing recorded what a given release expected. That is survivable while nothing is deployed and a problem the moment something is. The generated migration is now committed: four tables, three enums, five foreign keys, and the per-farm unique index on gateway_printer_id. It needed one hand-added line to be usable on its own. drizzle-kit does not emit extension statements, but frame_embeddings.embedding is vector(512) with an ivfflat index, so as generated the migration only applied to a database somebody had already run `CREATE EXTENSION vector` on - which was true locally precisely because dev-env.sh does that, and would not have been true on a fresh deploy. `CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector` now leads the file, and it survives regeneration: drizzle only appends new migrations, and the diffing snapshot lives in meta/0000_snapshot.json rather than in the SQL. Verified by dropping the database, recreating it with no extensions at all (`pg_extension` count 0), and running db:migrate: the extension and all four tables were created, `db:generate` then reported no pending changes, and the e2e script still passed against both live printers on the result. `dev-env.sh schema` now runs `migrate` instead of `push`, so a local database and a deployed one get the schema by the same route - testing `push` locally while production runs `migrate` tests two different things. `push` is still available as its own command for iterating on a table that is still moving, with a comment about what it does not record. |
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octoturge
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42d4b3820a
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Add a runnable dev environment, and fix the pins that stopped it booting
The edge route had never been run. Adding a way to run it turned up that the server could not start at all, for two independent dependency reasons that typechecking could not see: - `elysia: ^1.1.26` had resolved to 1.4.30, which calls `t.Module` - a TypeBox 0.34 API - while this repo pinned TypeBox 0.33. `t.Module is not a function`. - `drizzle-typebox: ^0.2.1` resolved to a version whose peers demand `drizzle-orm >= 0.36`, against the `^0.33.0` pinned here. Importing it threw `Export named 'getViewSelectedFields' not found`. Both are caret ranges that drifted into combinations nobody chose. elysia, @sinclair/typebox and the drizzle packages are now pinned tightly, TypeBox forward to 0.34.52 (which satisfies Elysia and drizzle-typebox 0.1.1 alike), and tests/dependency_identity.test.ts fails if the TypeBox version ever differs between here and @continuum/ts-types - the skew that made every shared schema invalid, with an error message pointing at Standard Schema instead. Dropping to drizzle-typebox 0.1.1 widens `jsonb` in the generated validators, so `metadata` needs an explicit object shape in validators.ts; the column is declared `$type<Record<string, unknown>>()` and a validated body otherwise is not assignable to `.values()`. scripts/: - `install-docker.sh` - one-time host setup, kept separate because it touches the machine rather than containers. - `dev-env.sh up|down|reset|status|psql|schema|env` - Valkey + Postgres/pgvector. Uses docker-compose.yml when a daemon answers, and otherwise runs the same two services from apt. That fallback is not hypothetical: Docker cannot run in this sandbox at all. dockerd needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to build its bridge; with `--bridge=none --iptables=false` it starts but cannot unpack an image without CAP_SYS_ADMIN; with `--storage-driver=vfs` it still fails because registering a layer needs user namespaces, which are blocked outright. All three are host-level grants, so no script can work around them - hence a second path rather than a broken first one. - `e2e-edge.sh` - the test the unit tests cannot be. Seeds a farm, claims its printers, mints an edge token, runs the real continuum-proxy, and asserts live telemetry reached Postgres and a command reached a printer. It only sends a fan speed, only to a printer reporting IDLE, and puts it back afterwards. - `capture-gateway-frames.js` - records what a gateway really sends, for refreshing tests/fixtures/. Read-only unless FAN_TEST_PRINTER is set. The test comment referred to this before it existed. Verified end to end, from a dropped and freshly migrated database: `h2c` persisted as printing/RUNNING 22% layer 2/25 nozzle 230 bed 35 with 3 HMS alerts, `p1p` as idle/IDLE, and `POST /printers/:id/commands` reached the P1P's fan and came back ok:true. An unclaimed printer is refused 409 PRINTER_UNREACHABLE rather than guessed at. Two things the e2e script got wrong first, both now fixed in it: it waited for the first printer row instead of all of them, which silently tested only the v2 printer (a v1 Bambu reports one tick later); and `$!` after `( cd ... ) &` is the subshell, so cleanup left an orphaned gateway reconnecting with a token for a deleted farm and polluting the next run. Note: `drizzle/` is gitignored, so the generated migration is not committed and there is no migration history in the repo. Left as-is deliberately - that is a workflow call, flagged in PLAN.md. |