0d87c8cbcec7749998b8a9577220b4d7f41c0851
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 octoturge
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b7792ad335
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Refuse to boot without R2 credentials
`?? ""` on the access key and secret meant a deployment with no object storage configured started happily, and `POST /jobs` handed clients presigned URLs signed with an empty key. The first sign of trouble was a 403 from R2 - either in the client's uploader or, worse, inside a gateway that had downloaded R2's XML error document in place of a print. Nothing in that chain said "R2 is not configured". Reads both credentials through a `required()` that throws, naming the variable, mirroring auth/verifier.ts and auth/edge_secret.ts. The endpoint is read with `||` rather than `??`, because the committed template ships `R2_ENDPOINT=` empty and `??` only catches null - so an empty value was taken as a real endpoint and the account-id derivation never ran. That is the trap auth/edge_secret.ts documents, and it caught this line too, in the first draft of it. A test covers the derivation. Each boot-failure test fills every other variable so the one under test is the only thing missing; otherwise whichever variable is read first wins and the assertion passes for the wrong reason. e2e-edge.sh gains dummy values, since it boots the backend. It presigns nothing, so they only have to exist. |
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octoturge
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1db96caa91
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Stop falling back to a committed edge signing secret
`EDGE_JWT_SECRET` was read as `process.env.EDGE_JWT_SECRET ?? "dev-edge-secret-change-me"` in two places. Anything holding that string can mint an edge JWT for any `farm_id` it likes and open `/ws/edge/v1` as that farm's gateway: enough to feed a farm false telemetry and to receive the commands meant for its printers. It is in a git repository, so it is not a secret. The `??` made it worse rather than better. It only catches null and undefined, and the committed `.env.example` ships `EDGE_JWT_SECRET=` *empty* - so a deployment that copied the template and filled in everything else signed its edge JWTs with the empty string and never reached the fallback at all. That is exactly the case the fallback existed to cover. Both reads now come from `src/auth/edge_secret.ts`, which throws at module load if the variable is unset or empty. Same shape as `verifier.ts` and for the same reason: a backend that boots and then fails every gateway handshake looks like a network problem somewhere else. There is no development default on purpose - a secret that works out of the box is a secret that reaches production, and `openssl rand -hex 32` is a one-time cost. Tests: the empty-string case, since that is the one the template produced, and a grep for both shapes that reintroduce the hole - a literal passed to `jwt()`, and a defaulted read of the variable - plus an assertion that the variable is read in exactly one place. 60 pass. |
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octoturge
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d8f8653dee
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Authenticate and authorize every route: org layer + Supabase JWKS
Until now every HTTP route was unauthenticated. A probe against the
running server returned a farm's `edgeProxyToken` and a printer's
`accessCode` to an anonymous caller, and that pair is enough to connect
as a farm's gateway and drive its printers. The previous commit stopped
the credentials appearing in responses; this one makes the routes ask
who is calling.
Authentication. Access tokens are verified against the Supabase
project's published JWKS via `createSupabaseJwtVerifier` from
`@continuum/ts-core`: RS256, public key only, no secret in this
process. It replaces the HS256 `@elysiajs/jwt` path, where
`SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET` was simultaneously the verification key and a
key that could mint tokens, present in the environment of every
instance. `src/auth/verifier.ts` builds it at module load so a
misconfigured deployment fails at boot rather than on first login.
The edge-gateway token stays symmetric and that is not an
inconsistency: this service is both its issuer and its only verifier,
so there is no second party to keep a secret from. It now carries an
`exp`, which it did not, despite the response saying
`expiresInSeconds: 3600`.
Tenancy. An org layer above farms - `organisations`,
`org_members(org_id, user_id, role)`, `farms.org_id` - so a farm can
have more than one operator without sharing an account. `farms.owner_id`
is gone. Authorization is one rule applied everywhere: resolve the
thing being acted on back to an organisation and check the caller's
role there, user -> org -> farm -> printer, with nothing in between
carrying permissions of its own. The ladder is
`viewer` < `operator` < `owner`; printer commands and job submission
need `operator`, because they move physical machines, and that is the
one boundary here that is not about data.
A non-member gets 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm that a given farm
or printer id exists and belongs to someone, which is an enumeration
oracle over the whole system. 403 is kept for a member who may see the
record but not do this to it.
List endpoints scope in the `where` clause, not after the query - a
filter applied to the result is one `return` away from being skipped.
They are also bounded now (`limit`/`offset`, default 50, max 200
refused rather than clamped).
`ownerId` and `submittedBy` no longer come from request bodies. Nor do
the printer telemetry columns: `POST /printers` is narrowed to the
columns a client owns, because a client that could POST
`status: "idle"` could make the scheduler send work to a printer that
is mid-print.
Also fills the CRUD gaps that made the API unusable - PATCH and DELETE
for farms, printers, jobs and orgs, and membership management - plus
one error shape for the whole API via `toErrorResponse`, so an
authorization failure is a throw that leaves the handler rather than a
status somebody has to remember to set.
Guards on the two changes that cannot be undone through the API:
removing or demoting an organisation's last owner, and deleting an
organisation while farms are still attached (it would cascade to every
printer, print job and stored frame).
Migration 0001 is hand-edited after generation. drizzle-kit emitted
`ADD COLUMN org_id uuid NOT NULL`, which cannot apply to a populated
table, and dropped `owner_id` without moving what it encodes anywhere.
It now adds the column nullable, creates one organisation per distinct
legacy owner with that user as its `owner` member, points each farm at
it, and only then tightens the column and drops `owner_id`. Verified
both ways: from empty via `drizzle-kit migrate`, and against a seeded
database where two farms shared an owner and a third did not.
Testing. `scripts/dev-auth.ts` is a local RS256 issuer publishing a
JWKS at the path the backend fetches, so the real verification path is
testable without a Supabase project. The alternative was a test-only
bypass in the backend - an env var making it trust an unsigned token -
which would be a permanent hole one misconfiguration from production,
and would mean the code under test is not the code that ships.
- `tests/authz.test.ts` (19 tests): the role ladder written out in full
rather than derived the same way the implementation derives it, and
the real JWKS path - a token signed by a key outside the JWKS, an
expired token and a token with `aud: "anon"` (Supabase's own anon key
is a valid project JWT) are all rejected, with the same message, so
probing cannot tell which part of a forged token to fix next.
- `scripts/e2e-authz.sh` (68 assertions, real Postgres, real routes):
four users across two organisations; anonymous 401s, cross-org 404s,
viewer-cannot-command, operator-cannot-rotate, a spoofed
`submittedBy` in the body ignored, no credential in any read, and the
rotated token still minting an edge JWT.
- `scripts/e2e-edge.sh` updated for the org layer and now authenticates
as a seeded `operator` - the weakest role that should work, so the
run would fail if the command boundary were not where it claims to
be. Re-verified against both live printers: telemetry from `h2c` and
`p1p` persisted, and an authenticated `set_fan_speed` went
HTTP -> WebSocket -> MQTT -> P1P and back `ok:true`, fan returned
to 0.
Two bugs found in the test scripts while writing this, both the same
shape as the earlier `pkill -f` incident: `kill "${PID:-0}"` with an
unset PID signals the whole process group, including the harness, and
`uuidgen` is not installed in this sandbox.
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