Prove the TURN-relayed camera path, the one the browser actually uses
The first e2e-camera.sh connected over direct host candidates. The real browser is pinned to iceTransportPolicy "relay", and PLAN.md recorded go2rtc's known trap for that configuration: a relay candidate on one side only can leave ICE stuck in `checking`. The script now runs the peer a second time pinned the same way, with the iceServers the backend hands out. The peer asserts its offer contains only `typ relay` candidates, so a pass cannot mean it connected directly, and never prints the credentials. Measured against the H2C: 937 packets (~943 KB) arrive through Cloudflare, and the trap did not occur. The phase is skipped with an explicit message when TURN credentials are absent, so a run without them cannot be mistaken for one that verified the relay. Both limits are written into the script header: viewer and gateway share a host, so this is not two distinct NATs, and no real browser has rendered a frame.
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@@ -9,13 +9,21 @@
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# more than it was because a stray go2rtc left over from an earlier run
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# answered the stub with an HTTP 500 and the test still printed "ok".
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#
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# This one runs the real thing end to end:
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# This one runs the real thing end to end, twice - once over direct candidates
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# and once pinned to relay-only through Cloudflare TURN, which is how the real
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# browser is configured:
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#
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# werift peer (stands in for the browser)
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# -> POST /printers/:id/webrtc on the real backend
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# -> /ws/edge/v1 -> the real continuum-proxy -> its real go2rtc
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# -> RTSPS to the printer's camera
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# and the RTP that comes back is counted.
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# and the RTP that comes back is counted. The relay phase needs
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# CLOUDFLARE_TURN_KEY_ID / CLOUDFLARE_TURN_API_TOKEN and is skipped, with a
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# message saying the TURN path went unverified, when they are absent.
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#
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# Not covered: the viewer and the gateway share this host, so what is proven is
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# that ICE, DTLS and media work via TURN, not that they survive two distinct
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# NATs; and a real browser has still not rendered a frame.
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#
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# SAFETY: read-only against the printers. It sends no printer command of any
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# kind; the proxy's MQTT subscription is passive and the camera is a pull of
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@@ -205,25 +213,47 @@ ok "the generated go2rtc config is owner-only (mode $mode)"
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# --- 4. the viewer ---------------------------------------------------------
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echo "==> a real WebRTC peer plays the camera through the relay"
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RESULTS="$(BASE="$BASE" PRINTER_UUID="$CAM_UUID" ACCESS_TOKEN="$USER_TOKEN" bun scripts/e2e-camera-peer.ts 2>&1 || true)"
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SEEN=0; BAD=0
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while IFS=$'\t' read -r verdict label; do
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case "$verdict" in
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ok) ok "$label"; SEEN=$((SEEN + 1)) ;;
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FAILED) echo " FAILED: $label" >&2; SEEN=$((SEEN + 1)); BAD=$((BAD + 1)) ;;
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esac
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done < <(printf '%s\n' "$RESULTS" | grep -E "^(ok|FAILED)$(printf '\t')")
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# Fewer results than the peer's five checks means it died before finishing,
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# and a silent peer must not read as a pass.
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if [ "$SEEN" -lt 5 ] && [ "$BAD" -eq 0 ]; then
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BAD=1; echo " FAILED: the peer produced only $SEEN of 5 results" >&2
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fi
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if [ "$BAD" -ne 0 ]; then
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printf '%s\n' "$RESULTS" | sed 's/^/ | /' >&2
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fail "the camera did not deliver video"
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# Runs the peer once and reads its `ok<TAB>label` / `FAILED<TAB>label` lines.
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# $1 names the phase, $2 is how many results a complete run produces: fewer
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# means the peer died before finishing, and a silent peer must not read as a
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# pass.
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run_viewer() {
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local phase="$1" expected="$2" results seen=0 bad=0 verdict label
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shift 2
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results="$(env BASE="$BASE" PRINTER_UUID="$CAM_UUID" ACCESS_TOKEN="$USER_TOKEN" "$@" \
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bun scripts/e2e-camera-peer.ts 2>&1 || true)"
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while IFS=$'\t' read -r verdict label; do
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case "$verdict" in
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ok) ok "$label"; seen=$((seen + 1)) ;;
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FAILED) echo " FAILED: $label" >&2; seen=$((seen + 1)); bad=$((bad + 1)) ;;
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esac
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done < <(printf '%s\n' "$results" | grep -E "^(ok|FAILED)$(printf '\t')")
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if [ "$seen" -lt "$expected" ] && [ "$bad" -eq 0 ]; then
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bad=1; echo " FAILED: the $phase peer produced only $seen of $expected results" >&2
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fi
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if [ "$bad" -ne 0 ]; then
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printf '%s\n' "$results" | sed 's/^/ | /' >&2
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fail "the camera did not deliver video ($phase)"
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fi
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}
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echo "==> a real WebRTC peer plays the camera through the relay (direct candidates)"
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run_viewer "direct" 5
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# The path the product actually uses: the browser is pinned to relay-only, so
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# media goes through Cloudflare TURN. Needs real credentials, which come from
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# the environment, so it is skipped - loudly - rather than failed without them.
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if [ -n "${CLOUDFLARE_TURN_KEY_ID:-}" ] && [ -n "${CLOUDFLARE_TURN_API_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
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echo "==> the same camera, viewer pinned to relay-only through Cloudflare TURN"
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run_viewer "relay-only" 7 ICE_MODE=relay
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else
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echo " SKIPPED: relay-only phase - CLOUDFLARE_TURN_KEY_ID / CLOUDFLARE_TURN_API_TOKEN not set."
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echo " The TURN-relayed path, which the browser is pinned to, is NOT verified by this run."
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fi
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echo
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echo "PASS - a real WebRTC peer received video from the printer's camera"
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echo " through the backend relay, the uplink, the proxy and go2rtc."
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if [ -n "${CLOUDFLARE_TURN_KEY_ID:-}" ] && [ -n "${CLOUDFLARE_TURN_API_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
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echo " Both directly and pinned to relay-only through Cloudflare TURN."
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fi
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