Until now every HTTP route was unauthenticated. A probe against the
running server returned a farm's `edgeProxyToken` and a printer's
`accessCode` to an anonymous caller, and that pair is enough to connect
as a farm's gateway and drive its printers. The previous commit stopped
the credentials appearing in responses; this one makes the routes ask
who is calling.
Authentication. Access tokens are verified against the Supabase
project's published JWKS via `createSupabaseJwtVerifier` from
`@continuum/ts-core`: RS256, public key only, no secret in this
process. It replaces the HS256 `@elysiajs/jwt` path, where
`SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET` was simultaneously the verification key and a
key that could mint tokens, present in the environment of every
instance. `src/auth/verifier.ts` builds it at module load so a
misconfigured deployment fails at boot rather than on first login.
The edge-gateway token stays symmetric and that is not an
inconsistency: this service is both its issuer and its only verifier,
so there is no second party to keep a secret from. It now carries an
`exp`, which it did not, despite the response saying
`expiresInSeconds: 3600`.
Tenancy. An org layer above farms - `organisations`,
`org_members(org_id, user_id, role)`, `farms.org_id` - so a farm can
have more than one operator without sharing an account. `farms.owner_id`
is gone. Authorization is one rule applied everywhere: resolve the
thing being acted on back to an organisation and check the caller's
role there, user -> org -> farm -> printer, with nothing in between
carrying permissions of its own. The ladder is
`viewer` < `operator` < `owner`; printer commands and job submission
need `operator`, because they move physical machines, and that is the
one boundary here that is not about data.
A non-member gets 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm that a given farm
or printer id exists and belongs to someone, which is an enumeration
oracle over the whole system. 403 is kept for a member who may see the
record but not do this to it.
List endpoints scope in the `where` clause, not after the query - a
filter applied to the result is one `return` away from being skipped.
They are also bounded now (`limit`/`offset`, default 50, max 200
refused rather than clamped).
`ownerId` and `submittedBy` no longer come from request bodies. Nor do
the printer telemetry columns: `POST /printers` is narrowed to the
columns a client owns, because a client that could POST
`status: "idle"` could make the scheduler send work to a printer that
is mid-print.
Also fills the CRUD gaps that made the API unusable - PATCH and DELETE
for farms, printers, jobs and orgs, and membership management - plus
one error shape for the whole API via `toErrorResponse`, so an
authorization failure is a throw that leaves the handler rather than a
status somebody has to remember to set.
Guards on the two changes that cannot be undone through the API:
removing or demoting an organisation's last owner, and deleting an
organisation while farms are still attached (it would cascade to every
printer, print job and stored frame).
Migration 0001 is hand-edited after generation. drizzle-kit emitted
`ADD COLUMN org_id uuid NOT NULL`, which cannot apply to a populated
table, and dropped `owner_id` without moving what it encodes anywhere.
It now adds the column nullable, creates one organisation per distinct
legacy owner with that user as its `owner` member, points each farm at
it, and only then tightens the column and drops `owner_id`. Verified
both ways: from empty via `drizzle-kit migrate`, and against a seeded
database where two farms shared an owner and a third did not.
Testing. `scripts/dev-auth.ts` is a local RS256 issuer publishing a
JWKS at the path the backend fetches, so the real verification path is
testable without a Supabase project. The alternative was a test-only
bypass in the backend - an env var making it trust an unsigned token -
which would be a permanent hole one misconfiguration from production,
and would mean the code under test is not the code that ships.
- `tests/authz.test.ts` (19 tests): the role ladder written out in full
rather than derived the same way the implementation derives it, and
the real JWKS path - a token signed by a key outside the JWKS, an
expired token and a token with `aud: "anon"` (Supabase's own anon key
is a valid project JWT) are all rejected, with the same message, so
probing cannot tell which part of a forged token to fix next.
- `scripts/e2e-authz.sh` (68 assertions, real Postgres, real routes):
four users across two organisations; anonymous 401s, cross-org 404s,
viewer-cannot-command, operator-cannot-rotate, a spoofed
`submittedBy` in the body ignored, no credential in any read, and the
rotated token still minting an edge JWT.
- `scripts/e2e-edge.sh` updated for the org layer and now authenticates
as a seeded `operator` - the weakest role that should work, so the
run would fail if the command boundary were not where it claims to
be. Re-verified against both live printers: telemetry from `h2c` and
`p1p` persisted, and an authenticated `set_fan_speed` went
HTTP -> WebSocket -> MQTT -> P1P and back `ok:true`, fan returned
to 0.
Two bugs found in the test scripts while writing this, both the same
shape as the earlier `pkill -f` incident: `kill "${PID:-0}"` with an
unset PID signals the whole process group, including the harness, and
`uuidgen` is not installed in this sandbox.
82 lines
3.7 KiB
SQL
82 lines
3.7 KiB
SQL
-- Hand-edited after generation. drizzle-kit emitted
|
|
-- ALTER TABLE "farms" ADD COLUMN "org_id" uuid NOT NULL;
|
|
-- which cannot apply to a farms table that already has rows, and it emitted
|
|
-- the DROP of "owner_id" without moving the ownership it encodes anywhere -
|
|
-- so an existing database would either refuse the migration or silently lose
|
|
-- who owned each farm.
|
|
--
|
|
-- The order below is the fix: add the column nullable, derive one
|
|
-- organisation per distinct owner and make that owner its `owner` member,
|
|
-- point each farm at it, and only then tighten the column and drop
|
|
-- "owner_id". Edited statements are marked; the rest is generated output.
|
|
--
|
|
-- Safe to keep across regeneration: drizzle only appends new migration files
|
|
-- and diffs against meta/0001_snapshot.json, not against this SQL.
|
|
DO $$ BEGIN
|
|
CREATE TYPE "public"."org_role" AS ENUM('viewer', 'operator', 'owner');
|
|
EXCEPTION
|
|
WHEN duplicate_object THEN null;
|
|
END $$;
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "organisations" (
|
|
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
|
|
"name" text NOT NULL,
|
|
"settings" jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
|
|
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
|
|
"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
|
|
);
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "org_members" (
|
|
"org_id" uuid NOT NULL,
|
|
"user_id" uuid NOT NULL,
|
|
"role" "org_role" DEFAULT 'viewer' NOT NULL,
|
|
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
|
|
"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
|
|
CONSTRAINT "org_members_org_id_user_id_pk" PRIMARY KEY("org_id","user_id")
|
|
);
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
DO $$ BEGIN
|
|
ALTER TABLE "org_members" ADD CONSTRAINT "org_members_org_id_organisations_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("org_id") REFERENCES "public"."organisations"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;
|
|
EXCEPTION
|
|
WHEN duplicate_object THEN null;
|
|
END $$;
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "org_members_user_id_idx" ON "org_members" USING btree ("user_id");--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
-- EDITED: generated as `uuid NOT NULL`. Nullable for now; tightened below,
|
|
-- once every row has a value.
|
|
ALTER TABLE "farms" ADD COLUMN "org_id" uuid;--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
-- EDITED (added): backfill. One organisation per distinct farms.owner_id,
|
|
-- with that user as its sole `owner` member. Farms that shared an owner end
|
|
-- up in one organisation together, which is what the old column meant.
|
|
--
|
|
-- A DO block rather than a temporary table so the whole thing is one
|
|
-- statement with no state outlasting it, and so RETURNING ... INTO can carry
|
|
-- each generated organisation id straight to the rows that need it.
|
|
DO $$
|
|
DECLARE
|
|
legacy_owner record;
|
|
new_org_id uuid;
|
|
BEGIN
|
|
FOR legacy_owner IN SELECT DISTINCT "owner_id" FROM "farms" LOOP
|
|
INSERT INTO "organisations" ("name")
|
|
VALUES ('Organisation ' || left(legacy_owner."owner_id"::text, 8))
|
|
RETURNING "id" INTO new_org_id;
|
|
|
|
INSERT INTO "org_members" ("org_id", "user_id", "role")
|
|
VALUES (new_org_id, legacy_owner."owner_id", 'owner');
|
|
|
|
UPDATE "farms" SET "org_id" = new_org_id WHERE "owner_id" = legacy_owner."owner_id";
|
|
END LOOP;
|
|
END $$;
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
-- EDITED (added): now that the backfill has run, enforce what the schema says.
|
|
ALTER TABLE "farms" ALTER COLUMN "org_id" SET NOT NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
DO $$ BEGIN
|
|
ALTER TABLE "farms" ADD CONSTRAINT "farms_org_id_organisations_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("org_id") REFERENCES "public"."organisations"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;
|
|
EXCEPTION
|
|
WHEN duplicate_object THEN null;
|
|
END $$;
|
|
--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "farms_org_id_idx" ON "farms" USING btree ("org_id");--> statement-breakpoint
|
|
ALTER TABLE "farms" DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS "owner_id";
|