`GET /printers` returned `accessCode` and `POST /farms` returned
`edgeProxyToken`, both to callers with no authentication of any kind. Verified
against a running server, not inferred:
POST /farms (no auth) -> "edgeProxyToken": "a39c1709-..."
GET /printers (no auth) -> {'accessCode': 'SECRET123', ...}
Those are not incidental fields. `accessCode` is the printer's own LAN
password, which Bambu uses for MQTT and as the FTPS password. `edgeProxyToken`
trades at POST /auth/edge-token for an edge JWT, which is enough to connect to
/ws/edge/v1 as that farm's gateway and send commands to its printers - a path
this repo's own e2e script walks end to end. So reading one unauthenticated
list was enough to take over a farm's machines.
src/db/projections.ts now defines, per table, which columns may appear in a
response, and the routes select those instead of `*`. Opt-in rather than a
deny-list: a column added later is excluded until somebody decides it should
be public, which is the safe direction to be wrong in. One helper builds both
shapes Drizzle needs - the `{ col: true }` map for the relational query API and
the column references for `.returning()` - from a single list of names, so the
two cannot drift.
`POST /farms/:id/edge-proxy-token` gives that credential one deliberate home.
It rotates and returns the new value rather than revealing the stored one: a
reveal endpoint hands the same secret to everyone who asks and leaves no trace,
whereas rotating makes a leaked token useless and reprovisioning the fix. The
cost is that it locks out a gateway still using the old token, which is the
right trade for a credential that drives physical machines.
This is defence in depth and NOT the fix. Every route here is still
unauthenticated and nothing scopes a farm to a caller - `ownerId` and
`submittedBy` are still taken from the request body, which means a client
declares who owns what. That is the next piece of work and it needs a decision
about the tenancy model first.
octoturge
01bcc73996